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FOREWORD 
The 10th Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group Reinsurance was held 7 July 2017, in Niederkassel 
near Köln. Some 80 representatives of the (re)insurance companies involved in the Sponsoring Group 
took part in the meeting, together with invited guests. Offered for the third time as part of the 
Annual Meeting, the Researchers’ Corner gave nine members of academic staff at the Cologne 
Research Centre for Reinsurance an opportunity to deliver short presentations on their individual 
research projects. Professor Materne also conducted interviews with Messrs Lorenz Kielwein and 
Frank Baumann. Kielwein reported on the application of mathematical systems theory to processes 
in change management, and Baumann on his 30 years of experience at Gothaer. 
During each of three sessions, three short lectures with posters were held in parallel and discussed 
afterwards. The heterogeneity of the topics presented by the staff members reflects the dovetailing 
of research theory with practice.  
In the sessions, the following speakers presented in German and English: 
Round 1 
a) Fabian Pütz (M.Sc.)
Alternative Capital and Basic Risk in the Standard Formula (Non-Life) of Solvency II
b) Manuel Dietmann (M.Sc.)
SFCR: Findings for Initial Publication
c) Jan Böggemann (B.Sc.)
Optimising the Purchase of Optional Reinsurance by an Industrial Insurer
Round 2 
a) Robert Joniec (M.Sc.)
Actuarial swap
b) Lucas Kaiser (M.Sc.)
The Impact of Different Determinants on the Rating of Reinsurance Companies
c) Lihong Wang (M.Sc., FCII)
Chinese Automobile Vehicle Recall Insurance
Round 3 
a) Sebastian Hoos (M.Sc., FCII)
Critical Analysis of the Practical Application of the Definition of an Event
b) Fabian Lassen (B.A.)
Employees in the Reinsurance Industry: Germany and the USA.
c) Kai-Olaf Knocks (M.A., FCII)
[Autonomous Driving: Evolution or Revolution?
The presentations also featured the work of another member of our staff who unfortunately, for 
logistical reasons, was able to present his research project in poster form but was not able to deliver 
a brief lecture. 
Poster  
d) Wolfgang Koch (B.A.)
Public-Private Partnership in Emerging and Developing Countries.
We would like to thank the funding bodies who make this event possible to begin with and provide 
our scholars an opportunity to conduct their research.  
Cologne, January 2018 Prof. Stefan Materne 
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10th Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group Reinsurance
Researchers’ Corner, 7th July 2017
Alternative Capital and Basic Risk in the Standard 
Formula (Non-Life) of Solvency II
Fabian Pütz, M.Sc.
 Principle-oriented regulatory content
• individuality of the respective basic risk
 Economically inadequate regulatory content
• e.g. basic risk from currency mismatches
 Heterogeneous regulatory content
• e.g. consideration of basic risk in trad. reinsurance
 Heterogeneous audit requirements
• e.g. auditing of different confidence levels
Claim trigger Modelling error Trigger risk Dynamic basic risk
parametric x x x
Modelled x (x) x
industry index x x
Assumptions
Amount of original claim in local currency
EUR 
100
compensation received from reinsurance in foreign 
currency 
USD 
112
1st case variant: Constant exchange rate 
Value of the original claim in local currency
EUR 
100
Value of compensation (USD 112) based on current 
exchange rate
EUR 
100
Difference in economic value EUR 0
2nd case variant: Appreciation in local currency 
Value of the original claim in local currency
EUR 
100
Value of compensation (USD 112) based on current 
exchange rate (EUR 1 = USD 1.20)
EUR 
93.3
Difference in economic value
EUR -
7.7
• Special requirements for design of
the SPV
 Counterparty default risk (nearly)
completely avoided
‘The risk that exists if the position covered by the risk-mitigation 
technique does not correspond to the risk position (...)’
Necessary consideration in
• solvency balance sheet
• Calculation of the SCR
• ORSA
How to quantify this?
• Concept of materiality for taking
basic risk into account
• Taking the ‘basic opportunity’ into account
• Basic risk in trad. reinsurance policies
• e.g. exclusions of liability
• definition of the ‘risk position’
Risk sponsor SPV (collateral) Investor
Principal
Interest/principal
Loss payments
Premiums
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Lecture by Fabian Pütz at the Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group 
Reinsurance on 7 July 2017 
Alternative Capital and Basic Risk in the Standard Formula of Solvency II 
The brief presentation presents the contents of the Master’s thesis of the same title: 
‘Alternative Capital und Basisrisiko in der Standardformel von Solvency II’. The aim of 
the Master’s thesis was, specifically, to investigate the extent to which the 
requirements of Solvency II take adequate account of the specificities of alternative 
reinsurance structures, based on the example of cat bonds for counterparty default 
risk (hereinafter referred to as ‘counterparty risk’) and the baseline underwriting risk 
under the principle of substance over form.  
If the basic construction of a cat bond is considered, a transaction always involves 
three parties: the risk sponsor, the SPV and the investors. The risk sponsor transfers 
underwriting risks to a special purpose vehicle by means of a suitably structured 
reinsurance agreement, which in turn securitises these risks and passes them along 
to the capital-market investors via a bond issue, which deposits the nominal amount 
of the bond up front to the collateral and, in accordance with the underwriting course 
of the covered risk portfolio, can preserve or lose the nominal amount including 
interest.  
Two points in particular are crucial for taking account of counterparty and baseline 
risk within this transaction. Counterparty risk is determined in particular by the design 
of the collateral, and the baseline underwriting risk arises as a function of the 
structure of the reinsurance agreement between the risk sponsor and the SPV. 
Specifically, the choice of the respective compensation trigger is crucial.  
Consideration of counterparty risk will be addressed only briefly here. Basically, it can 
be noted that the typical configuration of cat bonds with up-front payment of the 
collateral by investors reduces the solvency capital that must be kept for counterparty 
risk almost entirely. Counterparty risk is calculated essentially by multiplying the 
likelihood of default by a loss given default as the expected default amount in the 
event of default. When calculating this expected default, collateral can be deducted 
with its market value. If it is assumed that the collateral assets invested can generally 
be considered to be risk-free according to the standard formula (e.g. European 
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government bonds or OECD government bonds with a good rating), the resulting loss 
given default is equal to zero.  
If the baseline underwriting risk is considered, it should first be emphasised that 
these are not financial baseline risks from the capital investment but rather 
underwriting risks that arise out of the interaction of the original loss by the risk 
sponsor and the compensation from the reinsurance agreement.  
In principle, and speaking generally, the baseline underwriting risk can be 
characterised as the condition in which, from the point of view of the reinsured party 
or the risk sponsor, a difference exists between the compensation to be paid to own 
policyholders and the compensation received from the corresponding underwriting 
hedging instrument.  
Given this general definition, particularly questionable is the extent to which the 
baseline underwriting risk can exist on a compensation basis in the case of traditional 
reinsurance agreements. As a matter of principle, the wording of this definition also 
extends to situations in which the same circumstance governs traditional reinsurance 
contracts, for example through cover and risk exclusions, deductibles or self-
supported layers. In contrast to this general definition, baseline underwriting risk in 
the market-oriented practical perspective is largely attributed only to index-based 
compensation triggers; this is why the general definition presented above is rather 
broad from a market perspective. This discussion will be taken up again later. 
Using this market-oriented definition, a distinction is also made in the literature 
between different sources that give rise to baseline underwriting risk for index-based 
compensation triggers. On the one hand, this is the baseline risk from modelling 
errors, which can be paraphrased as the baseline risk ‘of the risk itself’. This may 
lead to a deviation from the compensation paid to own policyholders and the 
compensation received from the index-based reinsurance agreement if the overriding 
hazard, such as a storm, is modelled ‘wrongly’ in terms of its probability or the extent 
of loss involved. On the other hand, baseline underwriting risk arises from the 
materialisation of the trigger risk if – despite the assumption that perfect modelling of 
the overriding risk itself is possible – there can be a difference between the claims 
payment made and the relief received if the selected reference trigger fails to 
adequately reflect the loss of the portfolio. In addition to these two sources, in some 
cases the literature references dynamic baseline risk as a source. In principle, this 
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does not constitute a separate source of baseline underwriting risk and instead 
merely expresses that baseline risk may fluctuate over time.  
If this baseline underwriting risk within the context of Solvency II is considered in this 
general introduction, it can generally be said that this must be considered in the 
solvency balance sheet, in calculating the risk-mitigating effect of the solvency capital 
that must be kept and in the ORSA process. All in all, the requirements of Solvency II 
are formulated in a very qualitative way, which ultimately seems appropriate given to 
the individual nature of the underwriting risk.  
Under the requirements of Solvency II, baseline risk must be described as the risk 
that exists if the position covered by the risk mitigation technique no longer 
corresponds to the risk position (...).  One striking thing in the analysis of this general 
definition is in substance close to the general definition of baseline underwriting risk 
stated at the outset and is thus broader than the definition commonly seen in the 
market.  
It is therefore questionable to what extent the baseline underwriting risk must be 
taken into account in the case of traditional reinsurance contracts on a compensation 
basis. The requirements and Solvency II make contradictory statements on this point.  
On the one hand, the guidance on considering passive reinsurance requires that the 
content of cover, such as disclaimers, partial placements or franchises, be factored in 
at a confidence level of 99.5 percent. At the same time, the requirements for 
consideration of baseline underwriting risk in the solvency balance sheet stipulate 
that the item of recoverable amounts from reinsurance must be corrected only for 
contracts that are not formulated on a compensation basis. This results in a certain 
contradiction in the specifications.  
Also questionable is the point from which baseline risk should be regarded as 
material and hence to be taken into account. Here, too, there is no unambiguous 
statement to be found in the requirements. A sample case mentioned in which 
material baseline risk may be lacking is one in which the change in the value of the 
risk position covered by the risk-mitigation technique must reflect at least 90 percent 
of the change in value of the risk exposure. More generally, the exposure covered by 
a risk mitigation technique must be sufficiently similar to the entity’s risk exposure 
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and must reflect the change in value nearly identically when a comprehensive set of 
risk scenarios is applied. 
This scenario bundle also comprises scenarios that correspond to a confidence level 
of 99.5 percent. Conversely, this would mean that there would actually be no other 
confidence levels for which scenarios have to be tested. This requirement, however, 
is fundamentally inconsistent with the guidance on consideration of passive 
reinsurance, which only requires that appropriate coverage, such as disclaimers or 
franchises, be tested and assessed at a confidence level of 99.5 percent.  
Also questionable is the extent to which the characteristics of the baseline 
underwriting opportunity, i.e. an overcompensation on the part of the risk sponsor, 
must be taken into account. Because the concept of risk is logically defined as a 
downside risk in the calculation of the solvency capital requirement, consideration of 
the characteristics of the baseline opportunity would be considered inconsistent. In 
contrast, because valuation of the solvency balance sheet must be performed as a 
fair value balance sheet, consideration of the baseline underwriting opportunity 
appears to be necessary here.  
The last use case of the baseline underwriting risk is the presentation of baseline 
underwriting risk due to currency mismatches. Here, the specifications of Solvency II 
state that baseline underwriting risk must be taken into account if there is no fixed 
rate of exchange stipulated in the reinsurance agreement. If this requirement is 
considered in terms of its economic impact, however, then this sample calculation 
shows that baseline underwriting risk arises particularly if a fixed exchange rate has 
been agreed and the foreign currency in which the reinsurance agreement is 
denominated devalues the compensation paid to its own insured parties against the 
local currency. This case would result in an economic loss due to currency mismatch. 
In principle, the specification would have to be formulated in exactly the opposite 
sense, because if no fixed exchange rate has been agreed, the compensation would 
have to be converted at the current exchange rate; hence, there is no baseline risk 
due to currency fluctuations. 
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10th Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group Reinsurance
Researchers’ Corner, 7th July 2017
SFCR: Findings for Initial Publication
Manuel Dietmann M.Sc.
Sticking points identified in the SFCR
Earnings of the reinsurance industry
— Reporting obligation pursuant to SII for 30 German 
reinsurers 
— Own funds in the amount of EUR 209.4 bn
— Solvency capital requirement (SCR) of EUR 61.2 bn
— Average SCR coverage ratio of 342%
— Surplus cover among all reinsurers
— Market risk material risk driver
Deutsche 
Rück
214%
DEVK 
Re
394%
Gen Re
266%
Kieler
Rück 
233%
Munich
Re
317%
E+S
Rück
296%
R+V Re
348%
— Breakdown of actuarial earnings per HGB [German Commercial Code] to the Solvency II divisions
— Breakdown of investment result pursuant to HGB across Solvency II asset classesA
— Disclosures on the assessment of the adequacy of the governance system
— Explanation of the relative importance of fixed and variable compensation componentsB
— Different interpretation of the reg. requirements (risk exposure vs. solvency capital requirement)
— Quantitative disclosures on risk exposureC
— Depth of detail on the disclosures of actuarial reserves (including comprehensibility)
— Implementation of requirements for alternative valuation methodsD
— Already well prepared due to the extensive specifications of Day 1 reporting
— Initial request for internal model users to explain the differences to the standard formulaE
Comprehensive consistent implementation, inter alia with regard to:
Balance – depth of detail – terminology – regulatory references
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Lecture by Manuel Dietmann at the Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group 
Reinsurance on 7 July 2017 
SFCR: Erkenntnisse zur erstmaligen Veröffentlichung [SFCR: Findings for 
Initial Publication] 
22 May and 3 July 2017 marked the first dates on which German insurance 
companies were required to file full solvency and financial condition reports (SFCR). 
Reporting and disclosure requirements are anchored in the third pillar within the 
scope of Solvency II. Under Solvency II, reporting comprises, in addition to SFCR, 
the regular supervisory report (RSR), the company’s own risk and solvency 
assessment report (ORSA Report) and the quantitative reporting templates (QRT).  
SFCR and RSR follow the same structural breakdown as the mandatory structure 
laid down in the Annex to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35. 
Similarly, the requirements for the substance of the report are generally set out in the 
Commission Delegated Regulation and in some cases are specified by the EIOPA 
Guidelines (Guidelines on reporting and public disclosure) and the BaFin Information 
Sheet on Solvency II Reporting. The insurance companies have an obligation to 
strictly adhere to the requirements. The substantive specifications for SFCR and 
RSR differ from one another due to the different groups of addressees involved; a 
different depth of detail in the explanations is required as a result. While the RSR is 
only sent to the supervisory authority as part of the prudential reporting process, the 
SFCR is a report subject to public disclosure in order to ensure comparability and 
transparency. In order to take adequate account of the broad group of addressees, 
the focus in the case of the SFCR is upon intelligibility.   
Already in previous years, insurance companies had an obligation to submit selected 
chapters to the supervisory authority as part of reporting on the preparatory phase 
and Day 1 reporting. However, this was only an obligation to report to the 
supervisory authorities and did not lead to public disclosure. Accordingly, insurance 
companies were better prepared for Sections D and E, and parts of Section B, than 
for Sections A and C, which had to be drawn up for the first time. 
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There were a number of challenges that insurance companies had to overcome 
when drawing up the full SFCR for the first time. The sticking points identified, in 
terms of both process and content, are presented below. 
At the procedural level, the challenge, early in the reporting process, was to integrate 
all of the departments acting as subcontractors, and to communicate the internal 
reporting requirements. If this process did not take place, then the report exhibited 
overarching inconsistencies – for example, in the terms used, references to 
regulatory sources, the balance among the individual sections and the level of detail 
– and these inconsistencies subsequently increased the effort required for quality
assurance.
In Section A, ‘Business activity and operating result’, in addition to general business 
information, classification within the Group organisation and the main divisions 
operated, the core information consists particularly of the results of the financial 
statements in accordance with Solvency II. When implementing the requirements, 
consistent transfer of data granularity from the German Commercial Code [HGB] to 
Solvency II proved to be difficult. This relates not only to the breakdown of the 
underwriting result using commercial-law-based financial statements to the Solvency 
II business areas but also to the breakdown of the HGB-based investment result to 
the Solvency II asset classes. This is why not all insurance companies were able to 
fully implement the regulatory requirements for Section A.  
Section B, ‘Governance system’, essentially contains information on the 
organisational and operational structure of insurance companies based on Solvency 
II principles. In addition to information on organisational structure, the contents of the 
risk-management system, fit & proper, compensation, key functions and outsourcing 
must be drawn up as well. The sticking points discernible in this section were the 
disclosures on the rating of the governance system against the backdrop of the type, 
scope and complexity of the risks inherent in its business operations. Under the 
requirements of the Solvency II regulations, insurance companies have an obligation 
to review the governance system for appropriateness on a regular basis. The 
process used to review the governance system, which should be ensured by an 
audit plan or similar tools, is not yet fully established across all insurance companies. 
Some companies have not yet undertaken an explicit assessment. In addition, it was 
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found that some of the information on the remuneration system was waived full 
transparency, as the required explanations of the relative significance of fixed and 
variable shares were not described as required. Specifically, for the vast majority of 
insurance companies that do not apply IFRS in accounting, the disclosures on 
compensation entail previously unpublished and very sensitive information. 
For Section C, ‘Risk profile’, insurance companies have an obligation to provide 
disclosures on risk exposure, risk mitigation, risk concentration and risk sensitivity in 
order to use this information to provide an understandable explanation of the 
company-specific risk profile. The wording of the regulatory requirements for this 
section is relatively imprecise. As a consequence of this, the requirements have 
been interpreted differently by the companies, with different approaches observed 
with regard to the filling of the section. Particularly where the disclosures on risk 
exposure are concerned, a pronounced heterogeneity can be seen in the substantive 
statements made. While a portion of the insurance companies represented the SCR 
results for the scope and nature of the quantitative disclosures on risk exposure, 
another portion enlisted the underlying parameters, such as measures of volume, for 
explanation. Furthermore, it can also be stated that there is wide variance on the 
disclosures with regard to sensitivity to risk. In some cases, there were no 
quantitative disclosures presented in the report with regard to the stress tests and 
sensitivity analyses carried out. 
Section D, ‘Valuation for solvency purposes’, is intended primarily for a listing of 
information on the valuation of assets, underwriting reserves and other liabilities. 
This includes, inter alia, a description of the fundamentals, methods and main 
assumptions on which the valuation for solvency purposes is based, together with 
details around the material differences to a commercial-law valuation. Significant 
differences in depth of detail and comprehensibility were observed, in particular with 
regard to the notes on the technical provisions. Given the complexity of the topics 
involved, not all insurance companies have managed to dovetail adequate 
implementation of the content requirements with comprehensible language. Another 
topic in which implementation is heterogeneous concerns the disclosures on 
alternative valuation methods. A separate sub-section requires additional disclosures 
on assets and liabilities that qualify as alternative valuation methods (Level 3) under 
the three-tier valuation hierarchy in Solvency II. This section lays out the underlying 
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assumptions, the uncertainties in valuation, and the regularity with which the 
adequacy of valuation is subject to review. For the most part, this required 
information was not placed in the section designated for the purpose.  
The content required in Section E, ‘Capital management’, concerns own funds as 
well as the solvency capital requirement (SCR) and minimum capital requirement 
(MCR). For the most part, the insurance companies are already aware of the content 
to be explained, based on the extensive requirements of Day 1 reporting. 
Nevertheless, in some cases the reports are not entirely transparent. This was noted 
in particular with regard to the comments on the equalisation reserve. For the sake of 
comparability and comprehensibility, at least the key elements of the equalisation 
reserve should factor into the description as a material constituent of own funds. Not 
the subject of Day 1 reporting, and hence subject to explanation for the first time for 
users of internal models, is the presentation of any differences to the standard 
formula. Where the level of detail and comprehensibility are concerned, different 
emphases were observed in the statements. For example, there was very little 
explanation of the differences in aggregation and diversification versus the standard 
formula. 
The solvency ratios of the 30 German reinsurers subject to reporting under Solvency 
II exhibit a very positive result. With own funds of approximately EUR 209.4 bn and a 
solvency capital requirement of approx. EUR 61.2 bn, this results in a weighted 
coverage ratio of 342%. All reinsurance undertakings reported surplus cover as at 
the balance sheet date. The reinsurance firms generally exhibit a solid capital base 
that is capable of adequately cushioning any potential negative developments. 
Market risk was identified as a key risk driver. This is due, on the one hand, to the 
generally high level of exposure to market risks and, on the other hand, to the 
function played by many reinsurance companies as a holding company within an 
insurance group. Given this constellation, investments are taken into account in 
market risk within the context of calculating the solvency capital requirement. 
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10th Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group Reinsurance
Researchers’ Corner, 7th July 2017
Optimizing the Purchase of Optional Reinsurance by an 
Industrial Insurer
Jan Böggemann, B. Sc.
What needs to be kept in mind?
• Specific organisational features
• Internal risk policies
• Design of the treaty, special acceptance
solutions possible where necessary
The diversification factor 
improves through 
cooperation between the 
compulsory and optional 
department 
Framework conditions
• Industrial insurance is in transition, due, among other things, to the low interest-rate environment,
excess capacity and hyper-competition
• This results in rising liability risks and insured sums
• Process optimisation presents a point of departure for reducing costs, and thus for increasing
competitiveness
What can be neglected?
• There is no need to distinguish between
purchases of an expansion of capacity versus
purchases of an expansion of cover
Theses
1. There is a difference between the theory and practice of purchasing optional reinsurance
2. With a clearly designed process, the industrial insurer can reduce its costs
3. On average, an industrial insurer can achieve better placement results, thanks to largely central
purchasing
Underwriter of the primary insurer vs. central reinsurance team
• PI UW  much better awareness of risk, although the core mission is actuarial analysis
• RI team  much better market overview and better process expertise
Central purchasing leads 
gives the primary insurer 
greater negotiating power, 
and hence better placement 
results
Involving all purchasing 
stakeholders as early in the 
process as possible 
generates synergy effects 
that lead to a reduction in 
cost
Step 1 & 4
If step 1 is met 
in full, queries –
hence follow-up 
costs – are 
reduced
* *
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Lecture by Jan Böggemann at the Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group 
Reinsurance on 7 July 2017 
Optimising the Purchase of Optional Reinsurance by an Industrial Insurer 
The lecture began with an explanation of the market framework conditions for an 
industrial insurer. The theses of the work were presented on the basis of these 
conditions, and the circumstances that can be considered or neglected in purchasing 
were described. The final portion of the lecture was devoted to the processing steps 
of the work, with closing statements made in relation to the theses presented.  
To judge from statements by various board members of industrial insurers, the 
framework conditions currently entail an environment of low interest rates, excess 
capacity and hyper-competition. In this regard, the sector is undergoing a radical 
transition. Low interest rates are making it more difficult to generate solid investment 
returns. This adds growing importance to underwriting analytics. Further framework 
conditions present insurance companies with rising liability risks and insured sums.  
Process optimisation presents a point of departure for reducing costs, and thus for 
increasing competitiveness. One process that can be reviewed for its efficiency is the 
purchase of optional reinsurance by an industrial insurer.  
As a result of the work, the following three theses were put forward: 
1. There is a difference between the theory and practice of purchasing optional
reinsurance
2. With a clearly designed process in place, an industrial insurer can reduce its
costs
3. On average, an industrial insurer can achieve better placement results, thanks
to largely central purchasing
On the one hand, there are certain circumstances that must be taken into account 
when purchasing; on the other hand, there are certain circumstances that can safely 
go overlooked. The individual insurer’s organisational specificities and internal risk 
policies must be observed. These may specify, for instance, that only a certain 
percentage of a particular risk may be carried, even if the internal limit on net 
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capacity has not yet been reached. The reasons for this may be, for example, that 
the existing treaty should not be encumbered because a risk to be taken entails a 
high potential for damage. This is how an industrial insurer might seek a more 
favourable solution overall. Likewise, the design of the treaty must be taken into 
account, together with the extent to which a special acceptance solution is possible 
there. ‘Special acceptance’ means shifting the cover of a particular risk from the 
optional to the compulsory reinsurance policy. There is no need to distinguish 
between the purchase of an extension in gross capacity and an extension in cover, 
as the processing steps each involves are essentially identical.  
To assess whether the underwriter of the primary insurer or the reinsurance team 
should perform the processing steps that occur during the purchase of optional 
reinsurance, the respective strengths of the two parties must be emphasised. The 
primary insurer’s underwriter has considerably better knowledge of the risk involved. 
Its core mission, however, is underwriting analytics. By contrast, the reinsurance 
team has a much better overview of the market, along with better process expertise. 
A clear division of responsibilities is possible once the advantages and drawbacks of 
both parties are taken into account. 
When deciding that optional reinsurance is needed, all parties should be involved in 
the process at the earliest possible stage, to reduce any information asymmetry 
between them. Given its proximity to the risk, it is best for the primary insurer’s 
underwriter to compile the data required for the submission file. It should be noted, 
however, that the submission file should be compiled by the reinsurance team, as it 
has a better overview of the market and thus knows which information a reinsurer 
needs during the tendering process. If, for example, Step 1 has been met in full, this 
may lead to synergies that, in the best case, lead any queries about risk to disappear 
entirely. In the next step, it turned out that the distribution of the risk should not be 
based on the magnitude of the risk but on its complexity. Thus, simple upgrades in 
EVR-UW EVR-UW
RV-Team
EVR-UWEVR-UW
RV-Team
EVR-UW
RV-TeamRV-TeamRV-Team
EVR-UW
Beschluss, 
dass fak. 
RV 
benötigt 
wird
Deckungs-
einschluss
Brutto-
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erweiterung
Sammlung 
der 
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an RV-
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gross capacity and inclusions in cover can be performed by the reinsurance team. In 
the case of special risks such as the reinsurance of off-shore wind farms, this should 
be performed by the underwriter, working in conjunction with the responsible risk 
engineer. 
In conclusion, the following findings emerge: 
1. The diversification factor is improved through cooperation between the
compulsory and optional departments, as this bundles information on
reinsurance policies.
2. Involving all purchasing stakeholders as early in the process as possible
generates synergy effects that can lead to a reduction in cost.
3. Central purchasing leads gives the industrial insurer a greater negotiating
power, and hence better placement results.
To be discussed: 
- What is the order of magnitude of enterprise size up to which joint purchase of
compulsory and optional reinsurance make sense?
- What impacts does the more volatile optional business have on an industrial
insurer’s bargaining power?
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10th Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group Reinsurance
Researchers’ Corner, 7th July 2017
Actuarial Swap
Robert Joniec, M.Sc., FCII
The ART market is not efficient 
• there is no alternative
product with the same
effect as a quota RV (see
solvency bond prototype)
• Traditional avenues and
traditional contacts
dominate the overall
market
• Effects on transactions
costs and risk premiums
‘imperfect product landscape’
Asymmetrical information inefficient risk 
premium
Alternative capital
Non-proportional Proportional
Securitization / Collateralized Re / 
Side Cars
Securitization / Collateralized Re / 
Side Cars
Insurance Derivatives Actuarial Swap
-1.000.000
0
1.000.000
2.000.000
3.000.000
Pr
em
iu
m
 c
om
po
ne
nt
s 
[€
]
Fair Premium Safety Loading Dividends&Expenses Interest Rest
VR without RV VR and RVR after quota reinsurance VR and counterparty after actuarial swap
RoRAC of providers of capacity (deviation due to sliding 
scale commission in trad. contract)
Diversification effect of multiple actuarial swaps (i.i.d.) 
within an investment portfolio (RoRAC)
Challenges:
• Marketing
• Market cycle
• Business models
• Differences in theory
• Etc.
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Lecture by Robert Joniec at the Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group 
Reinsurance on 7 July 2017 
Actuarial swap 
In what follows, I will provide you with a rough overview of the market for alternative risk 
transfer and then focus on the actuarial swap to explain this product’s structure and effects.  
The ART market 
The market for alternative risk transfer (ART) can be characterised as inefficient. For 
several years, of course, there has been doctrinal trend that holds that all markets are more 
or less inefficient. Although this finding now enters into many decision-making processes, it 
does not translate into the stagnation of the financial world. There are, however, reasons to 
assume that transactions costs within the ART market are comparatively high. Although the 
ART market already represents an alternative to traditional reinsurance and is in 
competition with it, traditional players are dominant in both segments. Another argument is 
the imperfect product landscape in the ART market. If an insurer or reinsurer wishes to 
synthesise non-proportional reinsurance, it may do so with the aid of ‘alternative carriers’ 
(securitisation, side cars or collateralised reinsurance) or ‘alternative products’ (insurance 
derivatives). ‘Synthesising’ means that the effect of traditional reinsurance can be replicated 
with these alternatives. If an insurer or reinsurer intends to synthesise proportional 
reinsurance, this can only be done with the help of ‘alternative-carrier’ structures; among 
other things, these always require the establishment of a special-purpose vehicle (SPV). At 
this point, it should be noted that, at the 2016 Annual Meeting, Fabian Pütz presented the 
prototype of a corresponding solvency bond within the scope of his research at the Cologne 
Research Centre for Reinsurance. Consequently, there is currently no insurance derivative 
that has the capability to transfer underwriting risk in a proportional manner. This thesis 
contains two important limitations. First, there are longevity and mortality swaps in the life 
segment that entirely fall within the definition of an actuarial swap. Second, ‘not available’ 
means that such information is not publicly available to every market player, or that the 
topic has not yet been examined in the academic world – and in this case, both are true. 
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The concept of the actuarial swap 
The actuarial swap is an insurance derivative that transfers underwriting risk to a 
counterparty/investor in a proportional way. The idea is based on the natural parallel 
between a swap and a standard P&C insurance agreement.  
The policyholder pays regular and constant premiums in exchange for irregular and variable 
claims payments. This principle can also be applied to a portfolio of insurance risks. Since 
quota-share reinsurance represents a percentage share in the respective payment flows, 
there are fundamental parallels between a swap and quota-share reinsurance. In the 
second step, the components of a primary insurance premium were considered in order to 
implement them in isolation in a derivative. In principle, a premium consists of expected 
loss, a volatility surcharge and a surcharge for the insurer’s expenses and income targets. 
Within a quota-share reinsurance agreement with an assignment of 40%, 40% of all 
components are assigned to the reinsurer. The reinsurer pays for 40% of all claims. In 
addition to this, through the commission, it reimburses the assignor for the costs of 
canvassing and administering the respective business. Depending on how a commission is 
calibrated (a variable commission in this case), there may be a residual amount of money 
that can increase commissions within the scope of profit-sharing, or that the reinsurer may 
retain as additional profit. In the actuarial swap transaction, the assignor pays just 40% of 
the expected loss to the counterparty and still receives a refund of 40% of all claims 
incurred. In addition to the expected loss, the assignor pays a rate of interest that is meant 
to reflect the cost of capital. For the transaction to provide capital relief in the solvency 
balance sheet, the counterparty could invest an amount that corresponds to 40% of the 
SCR of the entire portfolio. A Monte Carlo simulation can test the impact of the agreements 
on the return on risk-adjusted capital (RoRAC) of the participating parties. Based on the 
RoRAC, the outcome shows that the impact of the agreements on its statistical distribution 
is identical. Changes emerge in a comparison of the alternative and traditional solutions 
through the extended design of the reinsurance agreement with a variable commission and 
a one-year carry-forward provision. It should be possible to integrate additions like these in 
equal measure into a swap. Generally speaking, the ISDA agreements provide a 
standardised and accepted basis for contract design. Finally, RoRAC can also be used to 
analyse the performance of a portfolio of multiple, actuarial swaps that are identically 
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distributed and statistically independent of one another. Just like the reinsurer, the investor 
benefits from diversification effects in its ‘insurance portfolio’. Based on these observations, 
and knowing that, for example, under the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), only non-
diversifiable risks lead to a risk premium that exceeds the risk-free interest rate, which is 
currently very low, the premium level in the overall market points suggests that structural 
inefficiencies exist. To this extent, a product such as the actuarial swap can, theoretically, 
generate added value. In practice, however, there are a number of hurdles to overcome, 
beginning with matters of understanding and marketing; these hurdles can also lead to 
failure as a result of different basic understanding in insurance vs. finance, differences in 
business models, and current levels of premiums or interest rates. This is why continual 
interaction with market players and experts is an essential part of the research project – 
and in this regard, we will continue to rely on your interactive feedback in future. 
Discussion 
• For this swap to be actually attractive to (re)insurers, it must qualify for capital relief
in the solvency balance sheet and be otherwise subject to adequate valuation within
HGB or IFRS.
• Knowledge of the possibilities in the ART market is still limited to relatively few
players. This helps these experts as well as the traditional market continue to
generate higher margins.
• One of the challenges will be transparent reporting and predictable managing of
such a swap between investor and assignor.
• In the financial world, there are not many investors who have [developed] sufficient
expertise to carry out appropriate investment underwriting.
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The Impact of Different Determinants on the 
Rating of Reinsurance Companies
Lucas Kaiser, M.Sc.
Generally, ratings reduce mutual
information asymmetries between the
contracting parties through the information
provided.
Ratings relate either to financial products
(e.g. CatBonds) or entire companies.
Financial-power ratings are an important
consideration when selecting a
reinsurance company. This reflects financial
stability and suggests security.
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‘premium volume’ is insufficient to justify a
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The Impact of Different Determinants on the Rating of Reinsurance Companies 
The importance of ratings has increased steeply in recent years. For assignors and 
investors in particular, a reinsurance company’s creditworthiness has a key role to 
play. The project considered whether a reinsurance company’s company size as well 
as its registered office significantly influence the rating result. 
Rating agencies serve as information intermediaries between and among market 
players in the insurance market. The information they provide reduces mutual infor-
mation asymmetries. Specifically, when purchasing reinsurance cover, an insurance 
company attaches importance to the financial solidity of the assignee. Primary insur-
ance companies purchase reinsurance protection in order to protect themselves 
against peak risks, on the one hand, and to reduce the risk capital they must retain 
on the other. Choosing the wrong assignees can have consequences that threaten a 
primary insurer’s very existence. This is why a reinsurance company with a solid rat-
ing is preferred. 
For an addressee of reinsurance ratings, the main focus is upon the performance of 
the reinsurance company rated. Contract fulfilment in the event of a claim is the top 
priority for a primary insurer. Financially strong reinsurers need to be solidly posi-
tioned across all their core processes (underwriting, risk policy, retrocession, etc.). 
The question arises as to whether large reinsurers tend to have higher rating scores. 
The basis for the review is the Standard & Poor’s ranking. Each year, Standard & 
Poor’s publishes a list of the top 40 reinsurers in the world, based on booked net 
premium volume. It can be stated that the determinant ‘premium volume’ is insuffi-
cient to justify high rating scores. As already discussed at the beginning of my re-
marks, there are other determinants that enter into the rating. Financial strength in 
particular, is not exclusively a function of premium volume and plays a major role in 
this regard. The basic conclusion that emerges from this is that large reinsurers do 
not tend to have better rating scores than their smaller counterparts. 
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Another criterion that can be enlisted to analyse rating scores is the ‘registered office 
of the rated reinsurance company’. The Standard & Poor’s rating list clusters rated 
reinsurers according to the country in which their registered offices are located. It 
then proceeds to average the scores for each country. It turns out that there is no 
significant difference per country. This could be justified by the fact that the country 
rating accounts for just a part of a reinsurance company’s total financial-strength rat-
ing. 
A score might also be a function of the criterion of ‘reinsurer type’. This criterion re-
fers to the division into EU/EEA reinsurers, equivalence reinsurers and third-country 
reinsurers. Triggered by the Solvency II Directive ratified in 2016, a restriction on the 
business activities of third-country reinsurers has entered into force in the EEA. 
The approach described above for determining averages of ‘booked net premium’ 
and ‘registered office’ categories was analogously applied to the ‘reinsurer type’ cat-
egory. There is a marginal difference across the three sub-categories of EU/EEA re-
insurers, equivalence reinsurers and third-country reinsurers. The averages for rating 
scores are distributed as follows, in descending order: EU/EEA reinsurers exhibit the 
highest average, followed by equivalence reinsurers and third-country reinsurers. 
Based on this, it might be concluded that the type of a reinsurance company might 
affect its rating score. This is the case, however, only if the rating agencies ascribe 
the lowest default risk to the EU/EEA region. 
Finally, US-based third-country reinsurers were considered more closely. Comparing 
these with the overall share of third-country reinsurers, it emerges that US reinsurers 
receive a significantly higher average rating score. This may owe to the fact that the 
US generally has higher regulatory requirements than those in effect in the other third 
countries, and that the rating agencies award correspondingly better scores as a re-
sult. 
Reinsurance ratings offer primary insurers a suitable tool for assessing a reinsurer’s 
financial strength. These ratings increase transparency and reduce the information 
asymmetries among the two parties to the agreement. Especially in insurance lines 
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with long-tail business, e.g. liability insurance, the assignors attach great importance 
to the security of the reinsurer. Rating scores in particular represent a driving factor 
for decision-making here. 
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Chinese Automobile Vehicle Recall Insurance
Lihong Wang, M.Sc, FCII
Recall Regulations
Date Legal background
01.09.1993 Product Quality Law
01.01.1994 Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and
Interests
01.10.2004 Provisions for the Administration of Recall of
Defective Auto Products
04.06.2004 Measures for the Administration of Information
System on Recall of Defective Auto Products
01.07.2010 Tort Law
17.01.2013 Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the
Implementation of the Regulations on the
Administration of Recall of Defective Auto Products
01.01.2016 Measures for the Implementation of the Regulations
on the Administration of the Recall of Defective Auto
Products
01.04.2017 Measures for the Administration of Import and Export
of Industrial Products
Risk accumulation
• Complexsupplychain (Traceability)
• Cedant risk accumulation (Market loss)
• Worldwide exposure (Add-on effect)
• Insurers, e.g. Allianz, ACE/Chubb, AIG,
Zurich and XL Catlin, are offering this
special class of business though various
channels.
• However, the loss ratios vary from company
to company.
• Rating models and analytical data are
largely unavailable.
• Recalls are strongly influenced by political
elements and media coverage.
Huge opportunities for insurers 
and reinsurers Risk categorisation is 
the key
Chinese non-Life insurance Segment Share in %
Property 10.2
Construction & Engineering 1.1 
Motor 77.5
Liability 3.8
Others (Surety & Bonds, Marine and Aviation) 7.4 
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection 
and Quarantine of P.R. China (AQSIQ)
- AQSIQ is a ministerial administrative organ directly under the
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, in charge of
national quality, metrology, certification and accreditation,
standardization, as well as administrative law enforcement.
- Announces recall regulations
- Orders recall actions
- Documents recall events
- Coordinates with other ministries (e.g. Ministry of
Commerce, Transport and Public Security, etc.)
Reinsurance
Insurance
• Claim experience  So far, there are few statistics
on the repair costs, and insurers have lack of control
over service stations.
• Product liability Personal Injury Liability can be
long and drawn out, due to ever-changing litigation
environment and uncertainty relating to internal
political power struggles and economic growth.
Product Innovation and Risk Engineering
Increased Obligations of Auto supply chain
Detailed regulation on Recall Process
Define legal liabilities
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In the following, I would like to present my latest findings in my ongoing research 
project on the Chinese Automobile Vehicle Recall insurance market. This will be a brief 
overview of the legal background, regulations and insurance aspects. 
China has become the biggest personal car market in the world. Over the last 25 years, 
there have been significant changes in the legal framework on product liability and 
product-recall requirements.  
Back in 1993 and 1994, laws including the product Quality Law and Laws on the 
Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests laid out milestone statutes on this 
subject by defining defects, recalls and responsibility for recalls for the first time.  
In 2004, the Provisions on the Administration of Recall of Defective Auto 
Products created the recall system. However, these provisions have been replaced 
by other regulations since 2016. 
Another milestone was the 2010 Tort Law of P.R. China, which defines tortious 
liability for recall and, most significantly, includes punitive liabilities.  
In 2013, a higher level of regulation, which is directly under the State Council, further 
refined the recall system for defective autos. This became a centralized administrative, 
rather than “merely” departmental, regulation.  
Later, in 2013, overseas recall information was also taken into consideration. The 
scope of quality and safety-risk information of products expanded from national to 
international boundaries.  
Since 2016, further detailed regulations have come into force. Documentation and 
implementation of recall systems have been further refined. From 1st April 2017 
onwards, The Measures for the Administration of Risks in Imported and Exported 
Industrial Products have included social and traffic accident information as sources 
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of information, and AQSIQ has introduced the concept of building risk-management 
systems through risk evaluation, early warning and rapid response.  
These laws and regulations define legal liabilities, expand details on recall processes 
and increase obligations of auto manufacturers and auto supply chain companies.  
The State General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
of P.R. China (AQSIQ) is a ministerial administrative organ directly under the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, in charge of national quality, metrology, 
certification and accreditation, standardization, as well as administrative law 
enforcement. This is the main government entity in charge of the recall regulations, 
announcing recall notices, ordering recall actions, conducting recall investigations, 
monitoring recall progress and documenting recall events. In practice, AQSIQ 
coordinates with other ministries (e.g. Ministry of Commerce, Transport and Public 
Security, etc.) 
In 2015 alone, there were approximately 250 recall announcements, involving 5.6 
million cars. In 2016, over 11 million cars were recalled, which represents a 103% 
increase, close to a quarter of all cars  manufactured and sold in China in that year. 
This involved joint ventures, and local and foreign imported car manufacturers. The 
graphs show a clear trend of more and more cars being affected.  
The top five causes of auto recalls, according to the AQSIQ 2015 annual report, have 
been 1) Airbags and seatbelts, 2) Engine, 3) Steering system, 4) Electronic equipment 
and 5) Transmission. In the case of electronic equipment, there were 32 
announcements, which is relatively high. This was due to the fact that cars are moving 
from traditional mechanical to more advanced, and consequently, more complicated 
electronic controlling systems.  
In China, the recalls have been increasingly influenced by political factors and media 
coverage. Other issues should not be ignored and include such issues as insurers 
having limited statistics on repair, replacement and refund costs and options, as well 
as limited control on the service stations. Personal injury could be long-tail business 
due to an evolving litigation system. 
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Under such increased demand and this stricter legal environment, only a few risk 
carriers in the market, including Allianz, ACE/Chubb, AIG, Zurich and XL Catlin, are 
offering this specialty insurance. The insurance covers both manufacturers and 
component suppliers. The loss ratios vary significantly among insurance companies 
and have led insurers to revise, adjust and modify insurance coverage, conditions and 
pricing. Rating models and analytical data are still largely unavailable and incomplete. 
Recall insurance covers the cost of getting a defective product back under the control 
of the manufacturer or merchandiser that would be responsible for possible bodily 
injury and property damage from its continued use or existence. Typically, these costs 
include recall costs, pre-recall costs, and increased cost of working after a recall, as 
well as brand rehabilitation and crisis management, etc.  
For the time being, liability insurance is relatively small in the non-life insurance sector 
(only 3.8%) when compared to the motor insurance (77.5%) and property insurance 
(10.2%). But the annual growth resulting from higher demand and stricter requirements 
is much higher compared to other lines of business.  
Reinsurers such as Swiss Re, Munich RE, Gen Re, Trans Re, etc., are the major 
supporters of this class of business, but most importantly also provide certain expertise 
in underwriting. With such help, insurers are better able to select and price their risks 
and set terms and conditions. Recall insurance will remain as a high entrance-barrier 
product. Risk engineering, selection and categorisation remain the key to success.  
From a portfolio management perspective, reinsurers should be aware of the 
increasing complexity in the supply chain (traceability), their risk accumulation and an 
add-on effect to their existing portfolio from other markets.  
This is an ongoing research project and is supported by TH Köln, University of Limerick 
and Sichuan University.  
Any suggestions and comments would be welcome. 
Please feel free to contact me at Lihong.Wang@th-koeln.de 
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Analysis of the status quo of the definition of ‘event’ under 
NatCat XL covers
Sebastian Hoos, M.Sc.
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In the course of discussions of individual cases of NatCat events, it became 
apparent that some loss-event clauses/definitions: 
 entail considerable interpretative latitude,
 are not compatible with information that can be generated from the claim systems,
 fail to offer the desired reinsurer relief in spite of ‘clear’ formulations.
Which individual losses must be aggregated into a ‘loss event’ in the sense of cumulative excess loss? 
The wording of every clause exists in a complex web of relationships and dependencies!
 No natural-hazard event clause is free from ‘blurring’ and
interpretative latitude in the cumulative damage case.
 Specification of the cover intention, however,
facilitates/permits interpretation of what was intended
when the contract was concluded.
 Each clause wording must meet the requirements of clarity
and practicability.
 Without knowledge of the ‘NatCat event’ in the sense of the
model used, there is a risk that the XL will be incorrectly
sized and misinterpreted in terms of priority and liability.
 If damage in passive reinsurance can not be attributed to a
natural-hazard-based event with sufficient precision, then
the step from pure ‘hourly events’ to stop-loss coverage is
very small.
Pure hours clause 
• De facto hours/daily stop loss.
• Simple filtering of individual losses
pertaining to a loss event, as there
is no spatial assignment necessary.
• Several events that are causally
separate or of shorter duration
can/must be grouped together.
• Longer-lasting events can/must be
broken down.
• Does exposure estimation suit a
(pure) period rule?
Scientific definition of ‘event’
• A cause defines a loss event.
• Avoiding fortuities when combining
claims to a/several loss event(s).
• Greatest possible variability: All
individual losses through the full
duration of the natural event are
recorded.
• Principle suits geophysical models
for exposure estimation (usually no
time limit).
Loss event ≙ natural event ≙ its 
period and area 
XL event = natural event + 
period limit
XL event = pure period-
based definition
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Critical Analysis of the Practical Application of the Definition of an Event 
1. Introduction
I would like to begin by briefly introducing myself in a few keywords.  In 2013, I 
successfully completed the course of study in Insurance at the Cologne University of 
Applied Sciences with a Master’s degree and a concentration on reinsurance and 
accounting. During my studies, I worked with Prof. Materne as a member of 
academic staff. In September 2013, I entered the career world as an assistant to the 
CEO of Deutsche Rück, Dr. Junke. Since the beginning of 2016, I have been working 
as a market specialist for the Property/ Casualty treaty business at Deutsche Rück.  
It is my pleasure to offer you a brief outline of my project work today in the short 
amount of time available – and, of course, to respond to your suggestions and 
questions. We examined the practical application of the definition of an ‘event’ 
against a backdrop in which this topic is subject to constant critically discussion in the 
reinsurance market. In a first step, we asked why the topic has recurrently occupied 
the market in recent years. This involves the fact that the reinsurance case is not 
always clearly and unambiguously defined in the underlying reinsurance agreements. 
This can lead to problems of delimitation. Let us take a look at the common types of 
agreement for reinsurance of natural hazards.  
o Under a storm/natural-hazard insurance ratio, a reinsurer shares a
percentage of every claim. In other words, it follows the original trend on a
1:1 basis, so that there are no issues of demarcation involved under this
type of contract (simply put, considered in isolation from any event limits in
the agreement).
o Under stop-loss, the reinsurer bears liability as soon as the total loss
burden from cat events exceeds a specified trigger point in the course of a
year. This, too, then, involves a non-controversial mode of action.
o NatCat-XL (also known as XL-per-event or excess-of-loss per event)
applies where one and the same event concerns multiple risks at the same
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time. Of central importance in the case of Cat-XL, then, is how the event or 
the case of cumulative loss is defined.  
As the market has often shown, the assignor and the reinsurer do not always have 
the same understanding of which individual claims may be aggregated on the basis 
of a particular event.  
2. Malfunction
This can lead to malfunctioning in cover and, concomitant with this, a need for 
coordination between the two parties. There are two characteristics to this 
malfunction:  
The 1st characteristic concerns priority. To our knowledge, in case of doubt, this level 
is the most discussed form. This means that the assignor is interested in assigning as 
many individual losses as possible to a particular event in order to exceed the priority 
and obtain relief from the reinsurer. 
The 2nd characteristic concerns exceeding the ceiling. To our knowledge, this issue 
has been discussed far less frequently on the market, even though exceeding the 
ceiling is considerably more substantial in material terms. When the River Elbe 
flooded in 2002, for instance, it is known that a major German primary insurer had 
significantly underestimated its exposure and thus ‘imaginatively’ interpreted the flood 
of the Elbe as 2 events in order to tap the limits twice. 
3. Test criteria
Against this backdrop, in the project, we tested the standard clauses based on 2 
criteria: 
1. Clarity
- Does the wording reflect the understanding of both parties to the
agreement?
- Is the original cover intention of the XL sufficiently clear or
guaranteed?
- Are the chosen ‘scientific terms’ unambiguous?
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- Are there precedents for a particular interpretation of the clause,
e.g. through past settlement practice?
2. Practicability
- Even if scientific events are phrased in perfectly clear language,
this does not help if the clause is not applicable as a practical
matter.
- In other words, are assignors’ conventional IT systems also
capable of mapping the clause?
- Theoretically, at least, every event as well as every claim has a
temporal and spatial signature, that must be ‘distinguished’ in
tandem with one another.
- This means that the location, the time and the cause of the
damage must be geocoded and unequivocally ascribed to a
geological event.
4. Case examples
Enough of the theoretical basics for now. Let us demonstrate the instances of doubt 
based on some examples.  
Sample case: Andreas, 27-28 July 2013 
This is a typical summer storm event in which extremely humid, hot summer air 
abruptly cools. This leads to a large number of local thunderstorms and hail. In late 
July 2013, another heat wave occurred in Central European as a result of advancing 
subtropical hot air. The highest temperature was measured at 40.2°C in Karlsruhe on 
27 July (IMK weather station). On 26 July, an intense thunderstorm system formed 
over France in connection with the fronts of the ANDREAS low-pressure area; on 27 
July, the system reached Belgium and, later, western and northern Germany. Over a 
swath extending from Gütersloh and through Bielefeld, Hameln, Hanover, Peine, 
Gifhorn, Wolfsburg, Helmstedt and in the Altmark, a supercell on the south-eastern 
edge of this system dropped locally extremely large hail, with hailstones 5 to 12 cm in 
diameter (Sehnde, south-east of Hanover). The front system associated with 
ANDREAS advanced slowly; on 28 July, another line of thunderstorms formed, this 
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time over the Rhine rift valley. As it moved eastwards, and especially in the region 
around Reutlingen and Tübingen, a supercell of this system – one day later and in a 
completely different region – dropped extremely large hailstones up to 10 cm in 
diameter. 
Now, inevitably, the question arises as to how many events occurred within the 
meaning of the reinsurance agreement. Let us look at the terms used in common 
definitions of loss events. Often, although not always, the language used is identical 
to the wording used in the case of a storm. For example:  
o Storm/hail damage originating from the same atmospheric disturbance
o A (storm/hail) event in the meteorological sense
o All individual losses incurred during a contiguous period of 72 hours
Also possible if there is a separate definition of hail: 
o ‘A temporally and spatially delimitable hailstorm’
Now let us examine the wording based on our test criteria: 
What does this mean: An atmospheric disturbance, or an event in the meteorological 
sense? This is not a clear scientific term! Thus, the wording is unclear! The following 
interpretations are possible and can also lead to a different impact of XL. We have a 
large number of small-area thunderstorm cells in different locations along a large-
scale storm front:  
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o if I interpret an atmospheric disturbance as TDG or large-scale weather
pattern, then it is 1 event.
o If I interpret the atmospheric disturbance as a hailstorm cell, then we are
dealing with 2 events.
It is now possible to determine whether there may possibly be a precedent from 
settlement practice in the past that would simplify the interpretation. Or does the 
cover intention of the agreement specify a possible interpretation:  
o In the present case, this is more of a comprehensive-cover portfolio, and
the structure of the XL is more likely to be for frequency cover, with a
priority in the low % range of the underlying premium. This would tend to
support the interpretation of 2 events.
o Or is the XL set up more for a building-based portfolio, one designed to
protect against major events (winter storms) with a comparatively higher
priority and a longer ceiling? Often, the xy-year ‘winter storm’ loss (of the
property portfolio) forms the benchmark.  In the present case, this would
tend to favour condensing the two hailstorms into a single event.
Agreed: let us say that, in the present case, the wording ‘temporally and spatially 
delimitable hailstorm’ has been clearly articulated and that the sample case consists 
of two events.  
The next question thus asks whether the wording of the clauses is sufficiently 
practicable. The assignor is now required to aggregate damage on a regionalised 
basis. In the case of ‘large-scale’ natural-hazard events (winter storms, for instance), 
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this is relatively easy to do. Here, it usually suffices to query the date of loss from the 
system. In the case of hail, as a relatively small-area event, the area affected by the 
meteorological event must be assigned as well! This means that the polygon of the 
hailstorm must be blended with the geocoded locations of the damage on the date of 
the hailstorm. Let’s say the hailstorm crossed over East Westphalia from 3:09 p.m. 
until 5:44 p.m. Now, using geocoded data, I need to map my loss data to that precise 
time and the affected region. This is more easily conceivable in the case of buildings. 
But what about mobile units (cars)? We all have a certain image of an insurance field 
service. In case of doubt, what the field agent will write in the notice of claim as to 
when the dented car belonging to one of his or her best customers was in a particular 
location is obvious. I deliberately exaggerate the scenario to highlight the problem 
involved. A 100% correct attribution of a loss to an event is virtually impossible.  
The definition specifying ‘all individual losses incurred during a contiguous period of 
72 hours’ is clear and hardly poses any problems in terms of attributions of damage. 
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Sample case: flooding 
In the case of the hazard of flooding, the issue of delimitation is a bit more 
pronounced than I can deal with in view of the time available here. The different 
characteristic forms of flooding alone call for certain kinds of interpretations and 
specifications. Floods essentially differ in form between rather large river flooding, on 
the one hand, and local, storm-induced flooding as a result of backflow or heavy 
rainfall. It is also necessary to question what the triggering moment is. In other words, 
when does an event begin? With the preparatory rain of TDG A, or rather with the 
triggering rain of TDG B? Moreover, the wording of clauses for flooding is often quite 
unclear. 
The term ‘contiguous flood area’ calls for a ‘clear’ spatial context. Do interruptions in 
a flooding area automatically establish a new area of flooding? 
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5. Conclusion
The cases presented here clearly show why interpretation of the term ‘event’ is a 
topic for recurrent discussion on the reinsurance market.  
1. The wording used thus presents wide interpretative latitude.
2. Some clauses do not match up with the assignors’ claims systems.
3. In some cases, the desired relief to reinsurers failed to materialise, despite the
‘clear’ clauses used.
Without knowledge of the ‘event’ in the sense of the model used, there is a risk that 
the XL will be incorrectly sized and misinterpreted in terms of priority and liability. 
Deriving from this is the inevitable question as to what alternatives exist, and what 
motivation speaks in favour of choosing a certain clause. This becomes clearest if 
you first consider the possible extreme forms.  
1) ‘Genuine’ scientific definition of an event
A natural-hazard event is 100% responsible for defining the loss event that itself most 
closely corresponds to the purpose of cumulative XL cover and is thus the most 
appropriate. To the best of my knowledge, this is virtually non-existent in the market, 
probably due to a lack of practicability. Particularly noteworthy in this connection are 
the issues described with regard to delimiting localised events that occur 
simultaneously, and the difficulty of circumscribing areas of flooding.  
3) Exclusive reliance on period rules
The other extreme consists of ‘pure’ time rules, e.g. taking the form: ‘All insured 
losses caused by the elements and occurring within a xxx-hour period’. Then we 
have a factual hourly or daily stop-loss that creates clarity for all contracting parties 
and is practicable as well. This approach represents a departure from the notion of 
the source of the loss, however. In particular, it is necessary to examine how period 
rules fit with estimates of exposure in the individual models.  
2) Mixed form:
Thus, in practice, one tends to encounter mixed forms of 1 and 3, some of which tend 
more in one or the other direction. In other words, there is an overarching definition of 
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the event, regardless of how clear that definition may be. This is often followed by 
specifications per individual hazard in conjunction with a (fixed or maximally 
interpretable) period of time.  
6. In closing
Finally, I would like to point out that the topic of this project was not about legal hair-
splitting. Instead, the purpose of the project was to help identify the various 
dependencies, correlations and associated instances of doubt (in some cases 
deliberately exaggerated) that can and do arise. The results of the project can serve 
as a basis for a critical examination of clauses individual to assignors, to permit 
needed adaptations and the greatest possible consensus between contracting 
parties prior to the loss event. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that some 
clauses have deliberately been formulated in vague terms in order to permit a certain 
margin of interpretation where necessary. 
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Employees in the Reinsurance Industry:
Germany and the USA
Fabian Lassen, B.A.
Employees in the reinsurance industry
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• Comparison of cost ratios
• Reinsurers with strong travel activity vs. reinsurers with numerous TGs/NLs
• Profitability of Sind RVr with only one location vs. RVr numerous locations
• Efficiency of local NLs in case of obligatory capitalisation (e.g. Germany, China, etc.)
The ratio represents the share of employees 
in reinsurance relative to the total number of 
employees in the insurance industry of the 
respective country.
DE (2015) USA (2015)
Approx. 7,000 Approx. 25,000
Tendency slightly rising Stagnant
Possible reasons for this development
• Financial crisis from 2007?
• Why DE, not USA?
• Jobs added by EVr, then job cuts?
• Jobs cut by RVr, then added?
• Additional reasons?
Year MR SR HR
2012 3.04 2.04 6.18
2013 3.17 2.19 6.76
2014 3.13 2.49 6.75
2015 2.59 2.48 5.54
Net reinsurance premium written per capita
Source: Standard & Poor’s, Global Reinsurance Highlights 2013-2016
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Lecture by Fabian Lassen at the Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group Re-
insurance on 7 July 2017 
 ‘Employees in the Reinsurance Industry: A Comparison between Germany and 
the USA’ 
People in the reinsurance sector, often bump into one another unexpectedly. One 
reason for this is the low number of employees in the reinsurance industry. With only 
around 7,000 employees throughout Germany, the likelihood of running into one an-
other is higher than in other sectors. This information forms the basis of the work pre-
sented here, which is currently still in the developmental stage and can therefore be 
advanced by practical ideas. 
The work is divided into three parts. The first part compares the two countries, Ger-
many and the USA, with regard to the number of employees in the reinsurance field 
and examines the trends. The second part then proceeds to compare the net per-
capita reinsurance premium volume of the two countries. With this in mind, the rein-
surers Munich Re, Swiss Re and Hannover Re are presented. In the last part, ideas 
for the further research are identified and will be discussed afterwards.  
In addition to a presentation of the absolute number of employees in Germany and 
the USA, these figures were also associated with the total number of employees in 
the insurance industry of the respective country. The rate calculated for the USA was 
consistently around 2%. In Germany, by contrast, it stood at about 3%. The German 
curve in particular is very interesting to consider, as it exhibits greater deflections. 
These can be divided into three phases. In the first phase, from 2003 to 2007, the 
rate rose slightly. From 2007, the rate fell before rising again from 2010. A reason for 
this development could be seen in the financial crisis in 2007. However, the question 
then arises as to why the crisis had a greater influence in Germany than in the USA. 
If the figures from which the quota for Germany is derived are considered, it can be 
stated that, in the first period from 2007 to 2010, primary insurers added positions 
while reinsurers eliminated them. From 2010, the trend was the exact opposite. This 
helps explain the resulting curve, but not the reasons underlying it.  
The second part addresses the net reinsurance premium per capita in the two coun-
tries. In this case, however, the charts are not quite comparable, as the German fig-
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ures are shown in euros and the US figures in US dollars. Nonetheless, a tendency 
can be recognized here which shows that reinsurance premiums written per capita in 
Germany exceed those in the USA. The difference could be due to the fact that, in 
Germany, perhaps more proportional reinsurance and less optional reinsurance is 
drawn up. And that, as a result, more of the business conducted is not as personnel-
heavy. At this stage, however, this can only be considered as a presumption.  
The next step is to move away from the country perspective and towards a compari-
son of reinsurers. Munich and Swiss Re as well as Hannover Re are compared with 
one another. Here we see that Hannover Re writes significantly more business per 
capita when compared with its competitors. One reason for this might be that both 
Munich Re and Swiss Re view themselves as service reinsurers and thus require 
more employees in the area of research and development than Hannover Re does. 
The slump in the net reinsurance premium written per capita from 2014 to 2015 at 
Munich Re and Hannover Re can be explained by fluctuations in exchange rate.  
This comparison of companies gave rise to ideas for further investigation: 
• Comparison between reinsurers with pronounced travel activity and reinsurers
with numerous subsidiaries and branches
• Profitability of reinsurers with just one location versus that of reinsurers with
numerous locations
• Efficiency of local branches in cases of compulsory capitalisation
This brings me to the end of my remarks; I would be very happy if it led to a stimulat-
ing discussion or feedback; thank you for your attention. 
Suggestions by participants: 
• The collapse in the number of employees in reinsurance in Germany in 2007
could be due to the takeover of Frankona Rückversicherungs-AG by Swiss
Re.
• In lieu of net reinsurance premium written, a comparison could also be con-
ducted between gross reinsurance premium and the reinsurers’ EBITDA.
• The differences in the reinsurance markets of the USA and Germany could be
pointed out, such as the larger number of smaller reinsurers and the greater
market dynamics due to the larger brokerage power.
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• It would be interesting to add another country, the UK in particular, as there
are also many smaller players here.
• As a recommendation for further investigation, it is expedient to pay attention
to which employees are included in the statistics.
Fabian Lassen, Bachelor of Arts, is a member of academic staff at the Cologne Re-
search Centre for Reinsurance (Director Prof. Stefan Materne) 
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Autonomous Driving: Evolution or Revolution?
Kai-Olaf Knocks, M.A., FCII
Source: markt.de
The smartphone revolution
Additional challenges / risks:
- cyber ​​as a new (cumulative) risk
- autonomous vs. non-autonomous vehicles
- Interaction of KH and product liability
- Hull cover: Further increase in the
encumbrance due to natural hazards
- Falling premium volume – rising volatility
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Importance of the motor-vehicle market
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Lecture by Kai-Olaf Knocks at the Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group 
Reinsurance on 7 July 2017 
 ‘Autonomous Driving: Evolution or Revolution of the Motor-Vehicle (Re-)Insurance 
Market?’ 
Importance of the motor-vehicle market 
Motor-vehicle insurance remains the largest segment in German non-life/accidence 
insurance, with a premium volume of EUR 25.9 billion in 2016. Due not only to the volume 
but also the high coverage amounts of up to EUR 100 m – with a small slice of the portfolio 
even offering unlimited coverage amounts – the motor-vehicle line also has major 
importance for the reinsurance sector.  
However, an increasing number of voices in the market are predicting the imminent end of 
motor-vehicle insurance. Studies show that nearly 90% of all accidents are the result of 
human error. Autonomous driving could thus lead to a considerable reduction in the 
frequency of claims. The significant decline in claims payments would also lead to a 
collapse in premium volume for this segment. 
The speed of the transformation 
But how quickly can such a development take place? The so-called ‘smartphone 
revolution’ is often cited as an example of a rapid, disruptive market development brought 
on by technological progress. Ten years ago, Apple introduced its first iPhone to the 
market and revolutionised the entire mobile-telephony industry. Many market players – 
and the market leader at the time in particular – were essentially overwhelmed by 
technological progress. But does this development also actually apply to the market for 
motor-vehicle insurance? There are several significant differences between a smartphone 
and a motor vehicle that actually do emerge upon closer inspection. The differences begin 
with the considerably higher acquisition costs of a car. Moreover, a great deal of 
investment in across-the-board autonomous driving will still be required to ensure 
networking of vehicles with each other. Added to this are the necessary changes in legal 
framework conditions. First legislation in this connection was passed in early May of this 
year. However, the new law requires drivers to retain capability of taking control of the 
vehicle. So what the law permits is not autonomous but rather automated driving, and 
initially for a limited period of two years. ‘Soft facts’ can also play a role in this regard. 
Many car owners like to drive themselves and do not want to (completely) surrender 
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control. Likely the most important reason, however, is the ever-increasing average age of 
cars, which is currently at around 9.3 years, and this significantly exceeds the service life 
of a mobile phone.  
That the period of transformation in the motor-vehicle market will be considerably longer is 
suggested when one considers new technologies and their spread in vehicle stock. Taking 
the evolution of ESP as an example, it turns out that the current inventory penetration of 
70% has been some 20 years in coming. There are currently around 45 million cars in 
Germany, while the number of new vehicles is holding relatively steady at around 3 million 
per year. These data can be used to extrapolate a possible scenario for the penetration of 
autonomous vehicles. The most recent current estimate by a major German car 
manufacturer comes from BMW and forecasts a capability for series production of self-
driving vehicles by 2021. The scenario analysis also requires an assumption about the 
share of autonomous vehicles among all new vehicles. The point of departure assumed in 
the present sample calculation was 5% in 2021. This share increases on a linear basis in 
the years that follow, to 1/3 after five years and 2/3 after ten years. After 15 years, it is 
assumed that a 100% share of vehicles will be self-driving. Based on these assumptions, 
the share of autonomous vehicles among all vehicles can be expected to stand at approx. 
20% in the year 2030. Even under an extreme scenario – with every new vehicle sold self-
driving from 2021 – it would take until 2035 to penetrate the entire stock of motor vehicles. 
The impact that these trends will have on insurance claims requirements needs to be 
presented on the basis of the original scenario calculation. The assumption made here is 
an annual increase of plus one percent in average claims. This trend has been observable 
in recent years and can be attributed to increasing costs of personal injury and to rising 
material costs due to the rise in additional technology (sensors, for example). By contrast, 
the frequency of claims has fallen steadily since 1999. Autonomous driving will significantly 
increase this trend in the medium term. As already pointed out, according to a study by TU 
Berlin, 86% of all traffic accidents are the result of human error. The scenario calculation 
optimistically assumes that the successive yet slowly increasing proportion of autonomous 
vehicles on the roads will lead to 90% fewer accidents. These assumptions about average 
claim and frequency of claims would thus lead to a reduction of approx. 10% in the claims 
requirement for motor-vehicle liability insurance by 2025. 
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Additional challenges/risks: 
What the scenario described above fails to consider, however, are the effects of additional 
new risks. Above all, cyber risk will also inevitably be introduced as a result of increasing 
networking of vehicles in the motor-vehicle sector. It also remains to be seen how the 
autonomous vehicles will interact with what in some cases are irrational-behaving, non-
autonomous vehicles still on the road. Another major issue involves delimiting 
manufacturer and owner liability, and this will lead to a shift away from motor-vehicle 
liability and towards product liability insurance. In the area of hull insurance, the continuing 
increase in the burden of natural hazards will negatively impact claims requirements. 
Finally – and particularly from the perspective of reinsurers – the falling premium volume 
will lead to increasing volatility. 
Conclusion 
The mobility approach of our society is certain to change in the coming years. Where the 
motor-vehicle (re)insurance market is concerned, though, the development we can expect 
to see will be more evolutionary than revolutionary.1 
Points for discussion after the lecture 
- To what extent does car-sharing affect the development of the car market?
- What might a development in hull insurance look like?
- Can autonomous driving actually reduce the frequency of claims so steeply?
1 GDV has since published a study that arrives at a similar conclusion: GDV-
THEMENSCHWERPUNKT – Automatisiertes Fahren – Auswirkungen auf den Schadenaufwand 
bis 2035. 
http://www.gdv.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/gdv-studie-2017-automatisiertes-fahren-
auswirkungen-auf-den-schadenaufwand-bis-2035.pdf 
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Public-Private Partnership
in Emerging and Developing Countries
Wolfgang Koch, B. A.
‘Public-Private Partnership’
 Public risks are to be transferred
to the (re)insurance industry
Public:
• Plannability of payments in the event of a
disaster
• Creating ‘resilience’ in the event of crisis
• Way out of the ‘sovereign-debt trap’
• Prevention leads to premium reduction
Reinsurance: 
• Development of a new business field
• Planning security with a long contract life
• Compulsory climate insurance possible in
countries with a stable legal system
Public:
• Damage event occurs without exceeding
the trigger point (‘basic risk’)
• Damage > insurance benefit
• Less flexibility compared to emergency
loans
Reinsurance:
• Danger of ‘moral hazard’
• Conflict of goals between political goals
and business goals
• Inability to pay the premium
Ex-ante measures
• Risk information
• Early-warning systems
• Structural protective measures
• Elaboration of emergency plans
Hedging financial consequences
• Climate insurance
 Quick payout linked
to parametric triggers
OpportunitiesThreats
With the support of reinsurers, an additional 400 million 
people in emerging and developing countries can be 
insured against natural disasters by 2020  
 Formation of sovereign cat pools advanced
 Moral hazard can be contained with the aid of ex-ante
measures and deductibles
 Insurance premium has been paid each year to date
 Sovereign cat pools operate with the aid of reinsurers’
capacity and expertise
Successes
Conclusion of 
climate 
insurance cover
(Re)insurance (risk 
carriers)
Sources of financing 
(premium payers)
Insured parties 
(states/authorities)
 Legal and regulatory
missions
 Information of the
population
 Development and
implementation of climate 
insurance
 Reinsurance of
‘sovereign cat pools’
 G7 countries
 World Bank
 Green Climate Fund
 Drought
 Flooding
 Storm
‘Sovereign cat pools’ perform risk 
pooling
Early-warning 
systems respond in 
time
Natural disaster occurs (Early) payout to affected 
areas
 Continuous increase in natural disasters in
emerging and developing countries
 Just 0.1% of the NatCat damage in 2016
covered in the ‘low-income group’
 Slow regeneration due to lack of economic
resources
 Taking out emergency loans leads to the
‘sovereign-debt trap’ Source: Munich 
RE
Source: Munich RE
Measures
‘Sovereign cat pools’
 Risk-pooling
• Quick mobilisation of
funds
• Pre-planning
processes for
vulnerable populations
• Ensuring delivery of
funding
• Network between
countries
Source: BMZ
Capacity and ‘know-how’
Transfer of responsibility
Procedu
re
Statement of the problem
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Lecture by Wolfgang Koch at the Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Group Re-
insurance on 7 July 2017 
 ‘Public-Private Partnership: Support of Emerging and Developing Countries’ 
Insurance and developing countries? At the micro level, with per-capita income in 
developing countries averaging USD 2 a day, this constellation seems indeed difficult 
to imagine. At the macro level, cooperative efforts by states, financiers and insurance 
companies makes the formation of so-called ‘sovereign cat pools’ and ‘climate insur-
ance’ possible – and even necessary! 
Climate change and the natural disasters in which it results, extreme weather condi-
tions and the creeping rise of water levels pose a major challenge for humanity. 
Global damage due to natural disasters, totalling USD 175 billion in 2016, primarily 
affects emerging and developing economies. The lack of ex-ante measures and risk 
information initially leads to relatively higher fatalities figures (1,900 deaths from 80 
loss events in the ‘low-income group’) than in industrialised countries (1,273 deaths 
from 245 loss events in the ‘high-income group’). Aggravating this problem are the 
factors of the comparatively large insurance gap and the resultant, slower economic 
recovery. A mere 0.1% of the USD 50 billion in insured losses due to nature in 2016 
were insured in the low-income group. Emerging and developing countries are par-
ticularly affected by hydrological and meteorological disasters.  
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What can be done to solve this problem? Initially, states, financiers and insurance 
companies can work together to take steps to address (structural) loss. Contingency 
plans can be drawn up and early-warning systems for risk information installed. 
(Re)insurers also assist these states through their collective expertise and best-
practice measures. 
In this context, successful ‘sovereign cat pools’ have already been created in many 
regions and include ARC, CCRIF or PCRAFI. Among other things, these entities pool 
risks around the ex-ante measures mentioned above. This gives participating coun-
tries a unified network through which they can conclude insurance protection. This 
includes rapid mobilisation of funds and pre-planning processes for the groups at 
risk. Brought about by political commitment, sovereign cat pools are responsible for 
implementing financing and emergency plans from the ex-ante phase in the event of 
a claim. Loss events are then covered by so-called ‘climate insurance’. Well-known 
financiers of the climate insurance are, for example, the G7 countries, the World 
Bank and the Green Climate Fund.  
For damage brought on by drought, storms or flooding, risk transfer is improved 
through sovereign cat pools, as risk diversification occurs across several countries 
with different risk profiles. By creating (less expensive) standard products based 
on the needs of the respective countries and structuring a portfolio of diversified 
country risks, Sovereign Cat Pools can offer significantly larger transactions that 
are attrac-tive to international reinsurance and capital markets.  
Insurance cover for premiums commensurate with risk also creates an incentive to 
actually implement the preventive measures mentioned a moment ago. This 
incentive is not created in advance by purely international aid such as food 
assistance. Lower risk translates into lower insurance premiums for states; this 
makes insurance cover affordable to emerging and developing economies as a 
result.  Cat bonds offer a particularly advantageous climate-insurance solution for 
emerging and developing economies. By linking claims payments to parametric 
triggers and thus rapid availability of liquidity, sovereign debt does not increase in 
the wake of a disaster; this helps prevent suppression of growth in emerging and 
developing econ-omies. This means there are no high opportunity costs for ex-post 
financing down-stream (loans, donations, etc.). Traditional insurance solutions fail 
to achieve a bene-fit such as this.  Furthermore, financing through cat bonds does 
not require direct state access to the capital market or the development of a local 
primary insurance market – a significant advantage for emerging and developing 
economies, as their access to the capital market is often limited.  
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Public-private partnerships are typically characterised by long-term, contractually 
se-cured planning security. Climate insurance has thus tapped a relatively new 
business area that, at least in hard market phases, can at least limit a shortage of 
reinsurance.  The creation of sovereign cat pools can primarily cushion the impact 
of short-term, economic shocks in developing countries, creating resilience as a 
result. Formation of international, compulsory insurance solutions, however, 
cannot be expected in countries subject for the most part to unstable legal systems 
and low income levels.  And where do the risks lie? To begin with, ‘adverse 
selection’ poses a risk for climate insurance. Insufficient information on the part of 
insurers thus leads to risks (e.g. terri-tories) insured for the same price despite 
their qualitative differences. This inade-quate information can be contained 
through extensive use of the collected experi-ence and statistics on natural 
disasters. Adverse selection is also limited by premi-ums that are commensurate 
with risk and the associated incentive to implement risk-mitigating measures before 
a loss occurs. 
Furthermore, use of parametric triggers largely limits all forms of ‘moral hazard’. 
This applies in particular to external moral hazards (caused by damage to third 
parties during repair) as well as to the ex-post moral hazard (caused by the 
policyholder subsequent to the occurrence of loss). When the trigger is activated, 
reinsurers pay damages in the amount previously agreed in the contract. 
Accordingly, the benefit amount is not subject to manipulation by third parties 
after the occurrence of the loss and is independent of any extensive use on the 
policyholders’ part. The ex-ante mor-al hazard (caused by policyholders prior to 
the loss) may also be limited by the effect of the risk-adequate premium, which 
creates incentives for policyholders to imple-ment preventive measures.  
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For the public, however, the baseline risk and the risk of underinsurance remain. If 
a parametric index is used as a trigger, baseline risk is at least lower than with a 
purely parametric trigger, but it cannot be completely ruled out.  
The confidentiality of privatisation contracts makes it difficult to make 
statements about the profitability to date of the public private partnership; to date, 
however, it has been possible (in terms of ARC), without exception, to pay 
insurance premiums through the support of the financiers. Worldwide reinsurance 
cover of ARC has a ca-pacity of USD 55 million. 
In summary, it can be said that emerging and developing economies do not have 
the resilience required to bear the consequences of natural disaster fully and 
inde-pendently through ex-post funding. Through their structure, the sovereign cat 
pools described create necessary incentives with which to implement preventive 
measures and give the states in the insurance pool the possibility to offer 
diversified country risks for significantly larger transactions as a means of 
providing the countries with insurance cover. This helps develop an independent 
resilience against the economic ‘shocks’ caused by natural disasters on the part of 
states within the pool. Resort to subsequent financing should be had only in the 
event of emergency and underinsur-ance. 
Public-private partnerships present states and (re)insurance companies alike with 
a multitude of opportunities. Shortly after the conclusion of climate insurance and 
the founding of ARC, the first loss event (drought) was already settled in 2015. 1.3 
million people in Niger, Mauritania and Senegal received insurance benefits 
totalling USD 26 million. As a result, some 500,000 head of livestock were 
rescued. All in all, be-tween now and 2020 ARC is set to insure fully 150 million 
people against climate risks. The aim of the entire climate-insurance initiative 
(‘InsuResilience’) is to in-crease the number of people insured against climate 
risks in developing economies from around 100 million in 2015 to 400 million by 
2020; this target is expected to be achieved. 
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